Exactly seven years after the abortive military putsch in Moscow that precipitated the collapse of Soviet communism, Russia confronts yet another crisis. Then, in August 1991, the consequences of the crisis appeared wholly benign, as it seemed to herald Russia's chance to move toward democracy and a market economy. Today, Russia's prospects are less clear and far more ominous.

The current crisis has both political and economic causes.

The political crisis derives from the inability of Russians to create a viable administrative system in place of the one-party regime that had ruled them for seven decades. In contrast to the Poles or Czechs, who had traditional political parties up until the time that Soviet rule was imposed on them in the 1940's, the Russians have no collective memory of pre-totalitarian parties.

There is no consensus whatsoever on any political issue: the so-called Red-Brown (Communist-Fascist) coalition that dominates Parliament shares no common values with the reform-minded members of President Boris Yeltsin's cabinet.

Hence, Russia is without effective government. To the extent that anyone rules, it is the 89 governors who run the provinces largely independently of the center and each other.

Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising that Mr. Yeltsin impulsively hires and fires prime ministers. It is one of the very few powers at his disposal. The unceremonial dismissal of Viktor Chernomyrdin five months ago in favor of Sergei Kiriyenko, and the recent removal of Mr. Kiriyenko in favor of the same Mr. Chernomyrdin, recall the political practices of czarism on the eve of the Russia Revolution, known at the time as "ministerial leapfrogs."

Although Mr. Chernomyrdin has better relations with the Duma than Mr. Kiriyenko does and even contemplates bringing communists into government, the shuffling seem to have less to do with politics or programs than with a desperate search for someone, anyone, seemingly capable, by some slight-of-hand, of fixing things.

Rumors abound that Mr. Yeltsin is about to be forced out of office in favor of Mr. Chernomyrdin. Mr. Yeltsin yesterday emphatically denied these rumors, insisting that he intends to serve out his full term. However, it appears that he will have to acquiesce to the inclusion of Communists in the cabinet. A coalition government, with Communist ministers in minor posts, may not be a bad thing.It will make the main opposition party, until now engaged exclusively in obstruction, a part of the system and hence responsible, to some degree, for its success or failure.

The economy's failure, which triggered the present crisis, is due, above all, to the inept handling of the budget. Russians are not accustomed to paying income taxes, which were unknown under czarism and communism. The Yeltsin Government has been unable to collect them from either enterprises or individuals because it lacks the political will and the bureaucratic personnel. The drop in the price of petroleum, Russia's main source of hard currency, has contributed to the deficits.

To cover them -- as it had to do to maintain the value of the ruble -- the Government has been borrowing heavily abroad mostly in the form of short-term loans. Unable to service the debt even with the help of the multibillion credit from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and Japan, Russia has effectively defaulted and withdrawn support of the ruble.

The results of these mistakes have been catastrophic. The seven years during which Russia could have laid the foundations of a viable democratic and capitalist order have been irretrievably squandered. Even if Russia succeeds in coming to terms with its foreign creditors, it is unlikely that foreigners will be willing to invest new money in it for years to come. And yet without massive injections of foreign capital, Russia cannot solve its economic problems, let alone provide its people with an acceptable standard of living.

The worst aspect of the current crisis is that it will discredit in the eyes of most Russians both democracy and capitalism. The two institutions -- the indispensable foundations of stability and prosperity -- appear to them today as nothing but a swindle. They were willing to put up with reduced consumption and the disappearance of social services because they saw them as temporary hardships.

But who will now be able to persuade them that the faith they placed in their country's currency was justified? Or that a President popularly elected is more responsive to their needs than one appointed by an all-knowing, all-powerful party? Anti-western feeling, which has been gaining ground lately, will certainly intensify, along with the sense that Russia must follow its own separate path.

The problem, however, is that in the modern world there is no other road to stability and prosperity than that charted by the western democracies. A return to communism is impossible not only because the majority of Russians oppose it, but also because it would require forcible expropriations of the assets acquired by private citizens since 1991. In other words, it would be yet another revolution for which the government has no strength and the citizenry no stomach.

A possible though unlikely alternative would be for Russia to dissolve into several sovereign nations. Under this scenario, authority would pass to governments closer to the people and more accountable to them. However, Russia, which since the l6th century has been a unified and centralized state, is most likely in no mood to be carved up and lose its national identity.

There remains the option of Russia turning into a Latin-American, quasi-democratic, quasi-capitalist state, with an economy that relies heavily on the export of natural resources and cheap labor. This seems to me a likely scenario because it can be achieved gradually, without violence, and still foster the illusion that Russia is following its own path.

The fact that Russia will be a third world country rather than a superpower would be masked by its arsenal of nuclear weapons, its immense size, its ability to intervene along its vast frontier, the longest of any country in the world, touching on three continents.

Although Russians fault the West for not having done all it could to help them make the transition from communism, the reality is that Moscow has received generous diplomatic and financial support: its foreign indebtedness tens of billions of dollars.

The question now arises whether this support should continue. The International Monetary Fund may take as long as a month before deciding whether to lend more money to Russia, though a $4.3 billion payout is scheduled for Sept. 15. Western leaders seem to have concluded that they will assist Russia further only if it enacts effective economic reforms. But the problem runs deeper: Russians have been relying on external aid to delay putting their house in order.

Top officials in Moscow have been heard to boast that the West cannot afford to let Russian democracy fail because they fear the alternative, and this claim has served as a subtle form of blackmail that has proved surprisingly effective. Foreign help should not give Russia an excuse for postponing political, economic and legal reforms.

It seems to me therefore, that under existing conditions the best policy toward Russia is one of hands off. This will force the Russians to acknowledge that the crisis they face is of their own making. They must solve their problems, both political and economic, and only after they have done so will they merit further assistance. Experience has shown that foreign aid extended in a more liberal manner is counterproductive.

Richard Pipes is professor emeritus of history at Harvard and the author of "The Unknown Lenin." He served as director of East European and Soviet affairs in the National Security Council in 1981 and 1982.